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THE PRECEDING CHAPTER'S overview of the characteristics and
financing of pension programs highlighted the past, present, and
potential future aggregate flows of income which the programs
generate. We examined the development of a network of arrange-
ments designed to transfer income (goods and services in real
terms) to individuals no longer in the work force. This income is
transferred from other individuals, of course, in a variety of ways.
This process and its possible economic effects are the subject of this
chapter.
PUBLIC PROGRAMS
The Primary Role of OASDJ
As we have seen, the major factor in the current and future
collection of receipts and distribution of benefits is the Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance system. A possible effect of
creating these expectations of old-age and survivor benefits is that
individuals would save less in other forms. That is, they would
substitute the accumulation of claims against the system for other
financial or tangible assets. Because coverage has become so close
to universal, it is not possible to test this possibility by comparingPensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 35
thesaving behavior of large groups of people not covered by
OASDI with those who are covered.
In Chapter IV, below, we deal systematically with the question of
the impact of other accumulations of pension claims on aggregate
saving. This is done by examining the saving behavior of house-
holds similar in most characteristics except coverage under a plan
which supplements OASDI. In the absence of a similar approach to
determining the effect of OASDI coverage on saving in other forms,
we turn to the reasoning developed by Cagan and Katona as dis-
cussed in Chapter IV.
Inessence, their hypothesis is that the promise of some minimum
level of income in old age stimulates motivation to supplement it in
other forms. These forms have included supplemental pension
plans, life insurance, and liquid-asset holdings. It is common prac-
tice, for example, for life insurance agents to provide information
about OASDI benefits to prospective purchasers of their policies.
This approach succeeds because the agent can present a program
for improving the adequacy of financial security to be built upon a
base which already exists. This is similar to the experience with life
insurance provided to members of the armed forces; on balance, it
has encouraged the sale of policies by agency companies.
The evidence summarized in Chapter IV supports the view that
the creation of equities in the OASDI system has not served as a
substitute for saving in other forms. Widely expressed fears that
individuals would lose their incentive to save if this comprehensive
protection were provided have proved to be without foundation.
However, the limitations of the body of evidence on saving behavior
should be kept in mind. To be more precise in describing experience
since the adoption of OASDI, we should state the conclusion in
these terms:
1. With social insurance providing a basic level or "floor" of
protection against the hazards of old age, disability, and death, the
record shows that it has been a stimulus to other individual and
group programs to serve the same ends.36 Economic Aspects of Pensions
2. The increases in OASDI benefits have not kept pace with
improvements in real living standards. To date, the program has not
provided an increasing share of total old-age income objectives.
3. We have no body of assembled evidence, therefore, as to what
would be the effect upon saving in other forms of achieving a goal
of "adequacy" as it might be defined in relation to some widely
accepted concept of living standards.
Robert M. Ball, the Commissioner of Social Security, urges that
we consider social security rather as a retirement system than as an
antipoverty program, pointing out that it is the only retirement
system for 80 per cent of the beneficiaries. He argues that a test of
adequacy is relevant and timely.' Similarly, the President's 1967
Budget Message discusses proposed changes in benefits in terms of
adequacy.
From what we know about the saving function of individuals, it
is impossible to specify the level at which prospective benefits cease
to stimulate saving in other forms and begin to inhibit it. The type
of analysis made by Cagan is a contribution to the search for
reliable evidence, but does not suggest answers which would neces-
sarily be applicable to a program of the size and scope of OASDI.
Revisions of a universally applicable system can be expected to
change the attitudes and expectations of a whole society.
Nevertheless, it is essential that this question be studied so that, if
decisions to move toward a concept of adequacy are made, their
consequences for saving in the economy may be taken into account.
This is not to say that economic factors should control. After all,
fiscal policy could be modified to offset the effects of changes in
OASDI if the possible effects were known and recognized. Chang-
ing the balance of saving and investment in the economy without
analysis of the long-range consequences will not contribute effec-
tively to the attainment of living standard goals for citizens of all
ages and circumstances.
1RobertM. Ball, "Policy Issues in Social Security," Social Security Bulletin,
June 1966, pp. 3—9.Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 37
The possible effects on saving habits of changing retirement
income expectations is, however, only one aspect of the operation of
OASDI. It may be the most significant aspect, but it relates only to
the matter of saving motivation. The other major economic aspect of
the system is its role as a collector of taxes and as a simultaneous
distributor of benefits. The growing volume of transfer payments
can have important economic effects on a current basis.
Early in our research program, John J. Carroll undertook a
thorough exploration of the possible effects of the whole range of
tax-supported programs.2 Such analysis depends upon a host of
assumptions about the shifting and incidence of taxes, 'the consump-
tion function, and consequences of changes in the distribution of
income.
For example, Carroll assumed that the employee's share of the
payroll tax is not shifted at all, but that the employer's share is
shifted to the extent of two thirds forward to the consumer and one
third backward to the employee.3 For the benchmark year 1957,
families with incomes below $4,000 were estimated to have contrib-
uted about 25percent of the payroll taxes and to have received
about 75percent of the benefits. The net gain to the lower-income
groups represented about 52percent of the benefit payments. The
transfers were largely from the middle-income groups.
These figures are illustrative of the power of the OASDI system
in redistributing income, whether or not they measure the magni-
tude precisely. If we make the usual assumption that the marginal
propensity to consume of families receiving benefits is materially
higher than that of those bearing the costs of the program, we can
2Themethodology employed in dealing with OASDI was developed in his mono-
graph Alternative Methods of Financing Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance, Michigan Governmental Studies No. 38, Institute of Public Administra-
tion, 1960. The results of the National Bureau analysis were presented to the Ad-
visory Committee for comment in the form of "Some Notes on the Redistributional
Effects of Mandated Pension Programs" and are the basis for the relevant analysis
in this chapter.
The effects of alternate assumptions on the shifting and incidence of the pay-
roll tax were also calculated.38 Economic Aspects of Pensions
conclude that the result is in the direction of an increase in con-
sumption and a reduction in saving. The calculation of transfers
between income brackets is obviously more reliable than estimates
of the impact on consumption and saving. In the latter case, we
have to estimate family expenditure patterns, not just their income
levels.
Carroll's analysis uncovered many gaps in the availability of
reliable current information. Some of these gaps are being filled by
the Social Security Administration and other agencies. It is not
altogether visionary to expect that in the future we shall be able to
consider revisions in the OASDI tax and benefit structure from three
points of view: (1) the level of benefits in the light of changing
living costs and standards, (2) the actuarial balance between re-
ceipts and benefits over the visible future, and (3) the effects of the
projected redistribution of income on consumption and saving.
The same type of analysis is also relevant to choices between
increases in the tax rate and increases in the maximum earnings
base to which it is applied. There are a number of considerations in
making such choices other than the extent of income redistribution
involved, yet surely this is relevant to the comprehensive design of
the over-all tax and expenditure policies of the federal government.4
Apart from the redistribution of income between income classes,
social security transfers claims for goods and services from one age
group to another. The productively employed meet the cost of
benefits to those no longer at work. When the level of benefits is
improved and taxes are increased, the young worker may be paying
more than the cost of his prospective benefits. Some students of the
system argue that this will ultimately create dissatisfaction on the
part of those most important in raising productivity. Of course,
the young workers may rest content with the notion that their turn
to enjoy improved benefits will come eventually. Or they may be
amenable to an erosion of the real value of old-age income promises
The long-range research program of the Social Security Administration in-
cludes most of the topics mentioned here.Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 39
by inflation as a means of lightening the impact of the transfers.
While such questions undoubtedly have some substance, it is by no
means clear that these are additional considerations not already
taken into account in the spending and saving decisions of the
individuals concerned.
Other Contributory Government Programs
The other major contributory governmental programs are Rail-
road Retirement, Federal Civil Service, and state and local govern-
ment retirement systems. Compared with OASDI, Carroll found
that for the benchmark year 1957 a smaller fraction of contribu-
tions to these programs (9 to 13 per cent) was attributable to the
lower-income groups and a somewhat smaller proportion of the
benefits paid out (60 per cent). The actual net transfers to families
with incomes less than $4,000 were very modest, however, because
of the low level of benefit payments relative to contributions in the
federal, state, and local government employee systems.
Because of the surplus from their current operations, the Federal
Civil Service and state and local government retirement systems
provided a net increase in saving after giving effect to the stimulus
to consumption of the transfers to lower-income families with
higher marginal propensities to consume. In these tax-supported
programs, we can see the effects upon saving and the capital mar-
kets of the funding process at work simultaneously with the redis-
tributing of income.
Non contributory Government Programs
Of the two major noncontributory programs supported by gen-
eral revenue taxation, veterans' benefits and old-age assistance, the
latter is the more effective in the redistribution of income. With tax
collections distributed across all income groups and benefits allo-
cated to the lowest income families, it is evident that this program
will stimulate consumption, precisely as it is intended to do.40 Economic Aspects of Pensions
Veterans' benefits are heavily concentrated among lower income
families, but a portion of the service-connected disability payments
go to middle and upper middle income families. Carroll found
reliable data particularly difficult to assemble in this section of his
analysis and his estimates are therefore tentative.
For the benchmark year 1957, these two noncontributory pro-
grams generated net transfers to families with less than $4,000
incomes on a substantial scale. The gain to these lower income
groups was almost as great as that of OASDI, despite the fact that
benefit payments were only 60 per cent as large. Shifting individuals
from old-age assistance to the social security benefit rolls or making
the corresponding substitution of benefits, then, reduces the income
redistribution effects and marginally reduces the shift from saving to
consumption. Because these noncontributory programs are sup-
ported from general revenues, a major share of the cost is borne by
upper middle income and high income groups.
Public Programs as a Whole
Looking at the gain-loss pattern of the six types of tax-supported
pension programs mentioned above, Carroll found that families
with incomes of less than $4,000 received about $8 billion in 1957
in the form of transfers from families whose incomes exceeded that
level. Of this figure, $5.3 billion went to families with incomes
under $2,000 per year. The estimated resulting net increase in
consumption expenditures was $1.3 billion.5
These figures are cited merely to provide an indication of the
direction and magnitude of income redistribution effects. The
growth in the economy and in the scale of the tax-supported pro-
grams requires a complete re-examination of the whole subject.
Subsequent research and the development of better data about
beneficiaries should make possible greater precision in the definition
figures for 1957 have little current significance, but they provide some
measure of the impact on saving of these programs at a specific point in time. The
results are not alarming, but the direction of the effects is clear.Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 41
of current alterations in the pattern of income distribution, spend-
ing, and saving.
Much more important, however, is the need for developing the
data and related models to permit a simulation of the future eco-
nomic effects of alternative decisions regarding the financing and
benefit structure of tax-supported pension programs. Carroll's pilot
study of redistributive effects suggests that in the future the growing
level of public-plan operations, apart from state and local govern-
ment retirement systems, will generate a substantial offset to that
saving which is done through private plans. This is especially true of
the federal noncontributory programs. Rational decision making in
this area requires that we develop the data and techniques to verify
and measure these possible developments on a prospective basis.
PRIVATE PROGRAMS
The Saving Aspect
The growth of pension programs for individuals in private em-
ployment has been so spectacular since 1940 that attention has
been concentrated primarily on the growth in coverage and fund
accumulations, a veritable explosion in pension expectations. The
response of individuals, as will be shown in Chapter IV, has been to
add their growing equities in private pension plans to saving in other
forms.
Taking net fund accumulations, exclusive of capital gains, as
the measure of saving through private pension plans, the past and
projected trend in this form of saving is as shown onp. 42.
These figures are designed to reflect changes in book values
without taking account of realized and unrealized capital gains on
common stocks and other investments with equity characteristics.
They do not recognize, therefore, the addition to assets represented
by the equity in corporate retained earnings. This is another way of
saying that the earnings on fund accumulations are substantially
understated. In Chapter V, we attempt to recognize this factor,42 Economic Aspects of Pensions
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Source: Institute of Life Insurance, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and Holland's
projections for 1970—1980.
which became of major significance after 1955, in projecting possi-
ble future asset accumulations.
If full recognition were given to appreciation in equity invest-
ments at an arbitrary 5 per cent rate, the changes in fund accumula-
tions at market values might be more like $9, $10, $13, and $15
billion for 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. However, if these high
returns are realized, there might well be a reduction in contributions
because of the earlier achievement of substantially full funding, an
increase in benefits, or a combination of the two. In that event,
these higher projected levels of saving through private plans based
on the recognition of market values would not be realized.
On balance, the trends suggest that the contribution to aggregate
saving of these programs for individuals in private employment will
be reaching a peak in another decade or so. The implications for
capital formation and the capital markets are discussed in Chapter
V.
Transfers: The Contribution Aspect
A measure of the dynamic growth in private arrangements is the
increase in contributions. The record of the recent past and Hol-
land's projections are as follows:Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 43
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Despite the growth of collectively bargained plans, which are rarely
contributory, and a gradual reduction in the proportion of conven-
tional plans requiring employee contributions, the fraction of total
contributions provided by the employer has apparently remained
stable at 86 per cent for the past decade. One dollar of contribu-
tions in seven, therefore, represents a form of individual saving by
the employee directly analogous to saving through life insurance or
any other medium.
The interest earnings of the funds represent a return for currently
setting aside the discounted cost of benefits payable in the future.
These earnings are presumably shared by the employee and the
employer approximately in proportion to their contributions. The
fact that the earnings are not taxed gives them full value.
It is more difficult to determine the cost incidence of the em-
ployer contribution. It is a part of total employment costs which
may be recovered in part by the individual firm if (1) the plan
serves to attract more productive employees; (2) it reduces turn-
over, training expenses, accidents, and spoilage; and (3) it provides
for orderly retirements and promotions as a part of more efficient
personnel management.
If the employer cost merely substitutes for other forms of com-
pensation, it has been shifted backward to the employee. The inci-
dence is not necessarily either equal or proportionate among indi-
vidual employees. This shift can take the form of a slower increase44 Economic Aspects of. Pensions
in money wages relative to productivity gains. Collective bargaining
over a total pay package appears to accept this concept, with pen-
sion and other fringe benefits substituted for or added to pay in-
creases in cents per hour. The well-paid and highly-paid employee
with long service may welcome this bargaining emphasis. The em-
ployer's larger contribution for a more liberal pension benefit is not
taxed to the employee currently as income; the tax impact is de-
ferred until retirement, when his effective tax rate will be signif-
icantly lower. Within limits, the marginal dollar of employer con-
tribution to pension benefits is worth more to the employee than the
incremental dollar of money wages added to his own retirement
savings.
A different situation may exist, however, when a pattern plan is
negotiated throughout a major industry without regard to produc-
tivity gains. Depending upon product demand elasticities, a price
rise to recover this added cost may cause a dechne in output and
employment or a shift from the utilization of labor to other factors
of production. The net effects may be extremely difficult to trace.
They obviously depend upon the economic environment and other
influences at work in the economy at the time.6
It appears that the shifting and incidence of the employer's cost
will vary with the characteristics of the industry and the firm within
it. There is no clear answer to the question but only a limitless array
of specific cases. Perhaps the best general conclusion we can reach
is that the net cost is probably shifted both forward and backward,
with a long-run reduction in corporate profits, and therefore corpo-
rate saving, taking place only in marginal instances.
Another "contribution" to private pension programs is the favor-
6Fora searching discussion of the various possibilities, see Challis A. Hall, Jr.,
"Retirement Contributions, the Spending Stream, and Growth," Federal Tax Policy
forEconomicGrowth and Stability, papers submitted by panelists appearing
before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, November 1955, pp. 786—797. I am indebted to Dr. Thomas E. White for
his analysis of the elements of this problem during his participation in the pension
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able income tax treatment given to employer contributions and fund
earnings. The Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment made the estimates for the year 1966, shown below.
Millions of
Dollars
Revenue gain from taxation of benefits received in excess
of employee contributions after the retirement in-
come credit +325
Revenue loss from exemption of interest earnings of
pension funds at individual tax rates —550
Revenue loss from not taxing to employees employer
contributions as made —1,150
Net revenue loss —1,375
Source: Private Pension Plans, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of
the Joint Economic Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, May 1966, p. 416.
Other factors being equal, this treatment of qualified pension
plans will increase the revenues to be collected from taxpayers in
general. Presumably, those not covered by pension arrangements
share in the costs without sharing in the benefits. These tax benefits
are, of course, equally applicable to the retirement systems for
government employees. Also, in the case of OASDI, all of the
benefit payments are exempt from taxation, with the result that
there is no deferred recovery of income taxes from the recipients..7
Transfers: The Benefit Aspect
The most dynamic phase of the growth in private programs is the
current and prospective increase in the flow of benefit payments.
The record of the recent past and Holland's projections show this
trend:
A possible change in this treatment of benefits is under discussion. An anomaly
in the present method of tax treatment is the increase in the value of the benefits
to an individual with substantial other income in retirement.46 Economic Aspects of Pensions
Benefits








The bulk of private pension benefits, almost by definition, go to
individuals who have had regular employment for an extended
period at good levels of compensation. Also, the benefit structure is
moderately progressive(i.e., providing a higher proportion of
higher compensation) to counterbalance the reverse pattern of
OASDI. A recent large sample of industrial plans shows the typical
range for the growing proportion of final pay plans:
Average Annual Compensation Median Benefit Range






Source: Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans.
Since we are uncertain about the incidence of contributions, it is
not feasible to estimate a redistribution of income between family
income classes as a result of transfers through private pension
programs. We may suspect that the redistributive effects are less
than in the case of state and local government retirement systems,
but how much less is open to question.
Some insight into the distribution of beneficiaries by income classPensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 47
can be gleaned from the Statistics of Income. Federal income tax
returns for 1964 on which at least one taxpayer was 65 or older
show the following reported income from pensions and annuities
(taxable portion):
Number of returns Taxable income reported
Percentage MillionsPercentage
Adjusted gross of of of
income classesThousandsTotal Dollars Total
Under $5,000 918 69.7 1,369 57.2
$5,000 to $9,999 260 19.7 581 24.3
$10,000 or more 140 10.6 444 18.5
Total 1,318 100.0 2,394 100.0
Source:Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1964, Individual Income Tax
Returns, Publication 79, January 1967, p. 90.
Presumably,a largenumber of individuals had small benefits but
were not required to file returns.
These data do not distinguish the source of the pension or an-
nuity income, but they suggest that the benefits in a recent year
went predominantly to middle-income family units. Private plans
could not have had a materially different pattern from the public
programs also included.
If employer contributions are largely shifted, and at least in part
to employees, it would appear that the effects of transfers between
income brackets work moderately in the direction of increasing
consumption, but at least for the present the impact cannot be
substantial.
PENSION PROGRAMS AS A WHOLE
Our exploration of the redistributive effects of the whole range of
public and private pension programs has produced only tentative48 Economic Aspects of Pensions
conclusions. It has uncovered gaps in information which our re-
sources could not hope to remedy. The fruitfulness of further re-
search and information gathering about family incomes and bud-
gets is evident. The intelligent appraisal. of alternative programs
requires that this type of research be pursued with the aid of im-
proved information and techniques of analysis.
The present and prospective transfers of income between age
groups are more easily measured. In a sense, they represent the
degree of success which has been achieved by the pension structure.
For these claims to be honored in full in real terms, individuals must
surrender a portion of current output either in exchange for prom-
ises of benefits in the future or in payment of tax assessments. That
is to say, wOrkers during their active years, on the whole, defer
consumption to their years of retirement. In programs covering
large groups, it is almost certain that the present value of the future
benefits to individual participants will be somewhat greater or less
than the consumption they forgo in the present. Such individual
gains and losses will be minimized, however, if the benefit formula
is equitable and the plan has been in effect for an extended period.
Under a pension plan in the design of which individuals have had
an opportunity to express their views, i.e., a voluntary or negotiated
plan, this kind of arrangement appears to involve no special burden
on the individual participant. While the saving feature may be
compulsory and the utility of retirement income may vary between
individuals depending upon their preferences and expectations, the
burden of participation in a plan characterized by equity and uni-
formity is not material.8 Wage-and-service-related benefit plans cov-
ering individuals in public and private employment, therefore, do
not involve significant burdens.
Tax-supported old-age benefits, on the other hand, involve the
burdens characteristic of any element of the revenue gathering and
distributing structure. The transfers between income brackets,
8Thisconclusion does not ignore the reality of possible income transfers from
younger to older workers, from men to women, from transient to career em-
ployees, and among individuals in different income classes.Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 49
which social insurance is designed to make, set up a pattern of gains
to those who earned less and losses to those who earned more
during their years of active employment. But this is no special
characteristic of pension arrangements; it is common to almost all
segments of the tax structure which involve the redistribution of
income among income classes and age groups.
There is evidence to the effect that a program involving greater
income redistribution creates greater resistance to that program on
the part of those bearing the burden of the transfers. In a study of
social security systems around the world, Henry Aaron found that
countries relying more heavily on general revenues tend to spend
less on social security in proportion to national income than coun-
tries relying more heavily on payroll taxes to finance benefits.9
The gain-loss patterns of social security, veterans' benefits, and
old-age assistance, however, cannot be considered apart from the
whole structure of transfers involved in the fiscal operations of
governmental units. The income redistribution effected by pension
arrangements must be examined in the context of the redistribution
effected by the personal income tax, excise taxes, or estate and gift
taxation. Moreover, it should be noted that to some extent social
security programs merely replace voluntary and intrafamily trans-
fers in favor of the aged. The substitution of tax burdens for the
individual's own perception of his obligation to an aged or disabled
person represents, therefore, a change only in the form of the
burden on the active worker.
We conclude that the structure of public and private pensions
involves no special burdens which are not characteristic of any
broad scale of income transfers over time and across a population
with a wide range of incomes and living standards.1° We also con-
clude that less burden is involved for individuals in a collective
Henry Aaron, "Social Security: International Comparisons," in Otto Eckstein,
ed., Studiesin the Economicsof Income A'Iain:enance, Washington, 1967, pp. 28—29.
10Fora closely reasoned discussion of this question of burdens, see Daniel M.
Holland, "The Pension Structure," FederalExpenditure Policyfor Economic
Growth and Stability, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, November 5,
1957, pp. 1007—1009.50 EconomicAspects of Pensions
sense when the full cost of benefits is recognized currently and the
excess of future over current costs is funded according to a system-
atic program. The reasoning runs as follows:
1. The excess of current contributions over current benefit pay-
ments, i.e., pension saving, finances capital formation. As a result,
productivity gains are greater than would otherwise be the case.
2. As the pension system matures, or comes closer to maturity,
the increasing transfers of output to beneficiaries are made from a
larger total output. The fraction of the current output transferred
from active to retired workers is, therefore, a smaller and less
burdensome one.
3. If a cohort of workers over their active working years saves
the capital accumulation and the earnings on it to enlarge total
output sufficiently to generate the goods and services which will
satisfy their claims in retirement, it has placed minimal burdens on
other workers.
However, this line of reasoning is based on a series of assump-
tions which are probably not equally valid. In the first place, it is
assumed that investment will expand to absorb the full addition to
saving at full-employment levels of output. A study by Simon Kuz-
nets supports this assumption."
Second, it is assumed that benefits are in a fixed relationship to
past savings. This is surely not entirely valid. In fact, we know that
economic growth and rising living standards will be accompanied
by improvements in the level of benefits, involving a supplemental
transfer of current output from the working to the retired group.
However, if inflation erodes the real value of money claims, the
price rise will partially offset this supplemental transfer process.
In summary, the maturing process never ends in a growing econ-
omy. There is a rising level of aspirations which results in transfers
to retired workers in excess of what they have contributed through
pension saving. Our reasoning, therefore, is that the burden of
"Capital in the American Economy: its Formation and Financing, Princeton
University Press for NBER, 1961.Pensions, Income Redistribution, Saving 51
pension benefits is lessened when they are provided at least in part
from additions to saving which has been employed in incremental
capital formation to expand real output. This should be true on the
average for individual burdens and for the burden on the productiv-
ity of the economy as a whole. One of the conditions promoting this
result is a minimal effect on the incentives of those engaged in
production.
Pay-as-you-go arrangements and those which use the taxing
power of government to make transfers of income are, in this sense,
the most burdensome pension programs since they entail no contri-
bution to capital formation.'2 We should be cautious about reaching
fixed conclusions on these matters. Within broad limits, the toler-
ance levels of individuals to accepting burdens and limitations on
their expenditure decisions are not fixed for all time. We know that
people can .and do adjust to all kinds of circumstances, including
burdens. This process takes place slowly and is greatly aided by a
sense of equity in the division of the costs incurred. The role of
economic analysis is to measure, more effectively than in the past,
the incidence of cost burdens and the distribution of benefits. If this
is done well, the choices and decisions on priorities among pro-
grams to enhance the level of living will be made, not by prototypes
of the economic man, but by an electorate better informed of the
economic consequences of efforts to meet desired social objectives.
In broad perspective, the limitations on what the American econ-
omy can "afford" to provide in the way of income maintenance to
older members of the population are costs (burdens of transfers)
incurred and the conflicting claims of other high-priority objectives
for its dependent members. That is, education of dependent chil-
dren competes for resources against better living standards for de-
12Pay-as-you-goplans of industrial organizations or of government, of course,
need not be more burdensome in every case. Contributions not made to fund future
costs may be directly invested to produce future productivity gains from which
rising benefit payments can be met. The after-tar return from these direct invest-
ments must be persistently high relative to the cost of capital from other sources
to make pay-as-you-go programs less burdensome than those which are systemati-
cally funded.52 EconomicAspects of Pensions
pendent senior citizens. The limitations are real resources and the
willingness of individuals to share gains in real income. The federal
government's tax-supported programs are essential to deal with the
large number of cases in which a stable employment relationship
does not exist. On balance, they are no more burdensome per dollar
of expenditure, and perhaps less so in the case of OASDI, than a
wide range of public service activities.
Funded employee retirement plans, whether public or private,13
involve less burden on the incentives of those actively engaged in
production. Through the saving and investment process, they
finance the economic progress which produces higher retirement
living standards. This is presumably the rationale for deferring the
incidence of income taxation on growth in the individual's pension
equity. In essence, it is also an answer to the question: What
difference does it make whether now and in the future a greater
proportion of retirement incomes is provided under private auspices
or under tax-supported governmental programs?
13 In this context, there is no distinction between the retirement systems of state
and local governments and the plans for individuals in private employment, since
both generate private saving and the financing of activities which enlarge the
output of goods and services.